Less than a year ago, French President Emmanuel Macron did not mince his words at the UN General Assembly when he slammed countries sitting on the fence about the Ukraine war, accusing them of “complicity” in Russia’s “new imperialism”.
“Those who are silent today are serving — whether against their will or secretly with a certain complicity — the cause of a new imperialism,” Macron said. « It is not a matter of choosing one side between East and West, or North or South. It’s a matter of responsibility » to the UN Charter, he added.
The Ukraine war has exposed rifts between the West and several Asian and African countries that see themselves as part of the “Global South”. While the West has roundly condemned the Russian aggression on Ukraine, several Global South nations have adopted a position of studied neutrality.
The list of speakers at the 2022 UN General Assembly included Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose country abstained five times from condemning the invasion at the UN, including a UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution demanding an independent inquiry on Russian violations in Ukraine.
Modi did get a mention in Macron’s speech. But it was not to chastise the Indian leader for New Delhi’s neutrality in the Ukraine war, nor its increased imports of cheap Russian oil under price caps imposed by global sanctions. Instead, the French leader praised his Indian counterpart for telling Russian President Vladimir Putin that, “today’s era is not a time for war” at a summit in Uzbekistan.
Macron’s soft spot for Modi will be on grand display on Friday, when the Indian prime minister attends the July 14 Bastille Day military parade in Paris as a guest of honour. The traditional military march on the Champs-Élysées will be followed by an untraditional “special dinner” for the visiting Indian prime minister in the magnificent Louvre, the world’s most visited museum.
Despite India’s failure to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Macron has proved to be exceptionally willing to forgive Modi, a man he frequently addresses as “my friend”.
It’s a friendship rooted in deep economic and geostrategic interests. The red-carpet treatment at the Bastille Day festivities is an acknowledgment of the ties that bind Paris and New Delhi.
Defence deals and bilateral trade strengthen the relationship between the two countries, with big ticket weapon purchases and record commercial aviation contracts grabbing international headlines.
India and France are also historically committed to a multipolar world order, the two countries traditionally balancing their relations with Washington DC and Moscow. The rise of China and its expanding ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, a strategic region for both countries, also sees a convergence of geopolitical interests between Paris and New Delhi.
But as Macron’s “with us or against us” speech at the UN displays, India and France have different interests in a world increasingly polarised by the Ukraine war. Beyond the official communiques and joint statements, those fundamental differences are raising questions in international policy circles.
Friend through ‘thick and thin’
Modi’s invitation to the Bastille Day military parade marks the 25th anniversary of the France-India Strategic Partnership, notes a joint statement on the Elysée presidential palace website.
The France-India Strategic Partnership is not a household term in either country, but it’s a perennial on bilateral communiques.
Launched in 1998, the partnership lies at the root of a commonly-held view in New Delhi circles that France is India’s friend through “thick and thin”.
A quarter-century ago, India was slapped with US sanctions for conducting nuclear tests in its western Pokhran desert region. They led India’s arch foe Pakistan to conduct similar tests, sparking nuclear escalation fears in South Asia.
France, pursuing its foreign policy independence from the US and eager to sign civil nuclear deals with India, refrained from condemning the Pokhran nuclear tests. Paris also took the opportunity to boost defence and security ties with New Delhi, a gesture that resonates with the Indian foreign policy establishment to this day.
“The image of France is pretty positive in India, which is due partly to the position [former French president] Jacques Chirac took after the 1998 nuclear tests,” explained Jean-Luc Racine, senior research fellow at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) and senior fellow at the Asia Centre. “The general image of France not completely following the US in the past has some resonance in India.”
‘Stick it to the US’ multipolarity
India and France share a longstanding call for a multipolar world order, a discourse that often translates more as a statement of intent than a workable action plan during crises that require major, or superpower, might.
The roots of the multipolar discourse run deep in both countries, dating back to the postwar era.
India, under its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of primarily postcolonial nations that refused to be officially aligned with either the US or the USSR. Since the end of the Cold War, NAM has struggled for relevance, keeping up criticisms of US foreign policy while granting Russia observer status in 2021.
France’s multipolar goal, on the other hand, was born out of the loss of its colonial empire during the Charles de Gaulle presidency, when Paris determined it would not follow Britain in becoming what it believed was a US vassal state. The position though has been difficult to maintain, resulting in occasional eruptions such de Gaulle’s temporary pulling out of NATO command only to get back into the Western military alliance fold.
While France and India maintain a commitment to multipolarity, the Ukraine war is challenging some of the unsaid, but fundamental imperatives of the strategic partnership.
‘India is afraid of China’
Although China is rarely mentioned in official statements, Beijing lies at the heart of the Paris-New Delhi convergence point, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, where the two countries have conducted naval exercises since the 1990s.
Both countries view Chinese expansionism with trepidation. France, with its overseas territories and 93% of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) located in the area, views the Indo-Pacific as a “priority” zone. The Indo-Pacific is also home to 1.5 million French people, as well as 8,000 soldiers stationed in the region, according to the French foreign ministry. Maritime access, including shipping lanes for trade, are crucial considerations for France – as they are for the EU and the US.
New Delhi’s concerns are closer home, and the stakes are higher. India shares a contested 2,500-kilometre border with China and is haunted by its defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Deadly border skirmishes have periodically erupted between the two countries and India is intensely aware of China’s superior military might.
New Delhi has historically looked to Moscow to contain Beijing’s expansionism in its Asian backyard. But the invasion of Ukraine has made an increasingly sanctioned and sidelined Russia dependent on China – to India’s disadvantage.
« The Americans and French alike are betting on India, hoping it will act as a counterweight to China. However, nothing is less certain, » said Christophe Jaffrelot, senior research fellow at CERI-Sciences Po and CNRS, in a recent interview with FRANCE 24. « In a position of weakness on several levels, India is afraid of China, to the point that it is not ready to oppose it, » he added.
Betting on India is a “short-term calculation” for France that “has its limits”, noted Jaffrelot in a column in the French daily Le Monde. “India is anxious not to alienate China and does not rule out collaborating with it – as it does within the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), explicitly to beat back Western domination,” he wrote.
Good and bad bets on India
India, under the Modi regime, has also pursued a transactional foreign policy of self-interest that has raised questions about its intent in Western capitals even as they woo Indian defence and trade contracts.
Shortly before Modi arrived in the US on a state visit last month, an article in the prestigious periodical, Foreign Affairs, by Ashely J. Tellis, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former US State Department advisor, created a splash in international policy circles.
In his piece, “America’s Bad Bet on India”, Tellis noted that the Biden administration had “overlooked India’s democratic erosion and its unhelpful foreign policy choices” in the hopes that the US can “solicit” New Delhi’s “contributions toward coalition defense”.
Those expectations are misguided, said Tellis. India “does not harbor any innate allegiance toward preserving the liberal international order and retains an enduring aversion toward participating in mutual defense”, he warned.
While the US, as the global superpower doing the heavy lifting in times of crises, seeks defence coalitions, France, as a middle power and NATO member, is less encumbered in following its military and economic interests.
With India’s weapons manufacturing capacity lagging behind China’s, New Delhi is a top shopper in the international arms bazaar – which works to France’s advantage. India is the world’s largest arms importer, with France long holding the spot of India’s second-largest weapons supplier after Russia, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
During Modi’s latest visit to France, India is expected to sign a naval fighter deal with France worth nearly €3 billion during Modi’s visit, according to news reports. Paris-based engine maker Safran and the Indian defence public sector firm Hindustan Aeronautics Limited are also likely to set up a joint venture to produce engines for locally-made helicopters during the visit.
Over the past few years, the France-India friendship has yielded headline figure deals that go down well with domestic audiences in both countries. So while Macron wagged a finger at countries staying neutral on the Ukraine war, he made no promise that it would downgrade to a hug with the signing of major deals.
